Monarchy and the End of Empire: The House of Windsor, the British Government, and the Post-war Commonwealth

Monarchy and the End of Empire: The House of Windsor, the British Government, and the Post-war Commonwealth

Philip Murphy

Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xiv + 240, ISBN 978-0-19-921423-5 (hardback)

Philip Murphy attempts the bold task of assessing the relationship between the British monarchy and the Commonwealth, tracing the connection from the evolution of dominion status, through transition to a multi-racial association and onward to contemporary uncertainties. His "model and inspiration" is Ben Pimlott's 1996 biography, The Queen, which challenged academics to take both monarchy and monarch seriously, identifying some of the Commonwealth issues explored here. (2) Murphy's title lists abstractions and collectives, but for the past sixty years, the monarchy has been Elizabeth II. The "British Shintoism" that John Grigg dared criticise in the 'fifties is much weaker nowadays, but it is still extraordinarily difficult for scholars to reconstruct the Queen's sentiments on any issue, and to distinguish between her personal initiatives and constitutional manipulation of her office and prestige. Thus, to a n unusual extent, the challenge of sources runs through this book.

Murphy took a principled decision not to use material from the Royal Archives, refusing to submit material for approval before publication, as is required. (In fact, all files from the present reign are closed.) Given the Queen's inability to defend herself against criticism, some protection of royal confidentiality is required, but the policy calls out for modernisation. Despite the trend towards greater overall access to official records from recent times, Murphy encountered withholding of documents in other archives that was not only unhelpful but sometimes downright goofy. He deduced, for instance, that the Prince of Wales had considered purchasing property in Australia in 1974 from the title of a closed file at Kew.

Evidence for the Queen's own opinions is necessarily indirect. Although both Palace and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials sometimes cited her views, it is not always clear that she was being pro-active or supportive of others. When former coutiers lift the lid on the Queen's thinking, are they speaking with authority or breaking ranks? Memoir-writing politicians tend to suffer from what Cardinal Wolsey, in elegant but tactless Latin, called "Ego et Rex", a tendency to assume that their tactful sovereign shared their opinions. When the Queen made it clear she was resolved to visit Ghana in 1961, an admiring Harold Macmillan commented that if the monarch was not prepared to take risks, "you might as well have a film star" in the job (77) -- but was prime minister quoting her or adding his own gloss? But if the Queen's opinions often remain opaque, they may be exceptionally well informed. Murphy reminds us that, at the time of Suez, she not only received Foreign Office telegrams, but was advised, constitutionally by Commonwealth leaders such as Menzies and -- in all probability -- unofficially by her husband's uncle, Mountbatten, First Sea Lord and critic of confrontation. Two areas remain shrouded: did Eden alert her to his collusion with Israel, and did she exercise her right to warn him against invading Egypt? Murphy suspects that she opposed the adventure, but ultimately the final decision is left to some future chronicler.

Throughout the decade after 1947, Britain attempted to disguise the retreat of decolonisation through the bestowal of independence in the form of dominion status. However, by the time of Nigerian independence in 1961, Whitehall thinking was shifting. The Queen would be embarrassed if the successor regime adopted radical policies and, in any case, it was demeaning that so many of her new realms promptly became republics. In practice, there have been few problems about the Queen's continuing role as multiple head of state in around one third of Commonwealth countries, since their relations are amicable and it is unlikely that she will ever be obliged to declare war upon herself. There have been occasional issues of potential conflicts in constitutional advice, for instance over British government concern that she would face demonstrations in Quebec, which she visited as Queen of Canada in 1964. And not even the most metaphysical monarch can be in two places at once, as Elizabeth II found in 1974 when she opened parliament in Canberra and then rushed to London to commission a new UK prime minister. Essentially, the system works because governors-general have become local heads of state. When Sir John Kerr dismissed Australia's elected government in 1975 and Sir Paul Scoon invited American intervention in Grenada in 1983, neither notified their sovereign in advance.

If the Queen's monarchical roles theoretically expose her to the risk of receiving conflicting advice, her position as Head of Commonwealth places her in a limbo where she takes orders from nobody, because there is nobody entitled to advise. When the Secretariat was established in 1975, the FCO was determined to keep things that way, opposing a channel of communication to the Palace on the Sir Humphreyish grounds that "there is no telling where it will lead". (126) The upshot is that the Commonwealth has become the outlet through which the Queen discharges her moving 1947 Cape Town vow of lifelong "service to our great Imperial family". (32) Many will regard Murphy's discussions of the her role at successive Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs) as the most valuable part of the book. Although reluctantly accepting Heath's advice to stay away from the angry Singapore meeting in 1971, she underlined that she regarded it as "her duty" to be present whenever possible. (130) She circumvented Downing Street's attempt to bar her from appearing in Ottawa two years later by accepting the advice to attend from her Canadian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau. The Queen's presence at Lusaka in 1979 and at Nassau in 1985 clearly moderated the atmosphere, arguably helping to avert potentially irreconcilable splits. Murphy has sent the agenda: it will be for a future official biographer to unravel whether her CHOGM roles have been interventionist or simply catalytic. Either way, the Queen's commitment is impressive.

Because the Queen's own opinions are wrapped in confidentiality, it is difficult to assess their influence in Commonwealth affairs. Vivid glimpses can be dangerously distorted: it would be unwise to take too seriously her joke to Lord Mountbatten that she would have responded to the unwelcome appearance of Idi Amin by striking him with a ceremonial sword. (135) Sometimes apparent initiatives are probably ministerially inspired, as when she gently nudged Jerry Rawlings into respecting his constitutional obligation to retire after two terms as Sierra Leone's president. No doubt many of her personal expressions reflect the right of encouragement recognised by Bagehot, as when she reassured Callaghan in 1976 that an initiative on Rhodesia would "worthwhile" even if "ineffective". (138) In fact, the Queen's own opinions seem invariably sensible. She was relaxed about new Commonwealth states becoming republics, even favouring inclusion of a timetable for the transition in the independence constitutions. With Malta in the 1970s and Australia two decades later, her primary emphases were upon the upholding of constitutional processes and acceptance of the popular will. Her main concern about Whitlam's decision to introduce an Australian honours system in 1974 was that too rapid a launch might damage the national unity that it was aimed to foster. The Queen supported the use of Marlborough House as a Commonwealth centre, while the location of the Commonwealth Day service in Westminster Abbey, a royal peculiar, also suggests her direct involvement. The Duke of Edinburgh has been more outspoken than his wife, raising the intriguing possibility of some relationship between their views, either ventriloquial or osmotic. Murphy does not pursue the possibility, unfairly characterising Philip's reports on the overseas Commonwealth as exuding "the proprietorial air of a landowner complaining to his staff about the condition of his estate". (79)

The title "Head of the Commonwealth" was invented for George VI in 1949 as a device to maintain republican India within the association. It is doubtful whether it was intended by member states, then or since, to be hereditary, although in an understandable wave of chivalry towards a young sovereign, it was quietly passed on at the King's death. The possibility of a rotating Headship among Commonwealth notables is sometimes discussed. We should remember the warning of the Philadelphia Convention, which designed the presidency of the United States for George Washington but did not foresee Richard Nixon. The Queen might well be replaced by someone of the standing of Desmond Tutu but, in an organisation dominated by consensual horse-trading, the third successor would probably be forgettable and the fourth might well be corrupt. As an FCO official concluded in 1973, it would be preferable "to drop the title altogether" after the present reign. (115) Murphy certainly thinks so, coyly drawing attention to a recent pamphlet arguing the case, but without mentioning himself as its co-author. Since the Commonwealth has evolved into an organisation characterised by equality of status irrespective of size, wealth or power, any concept of Headship must now convey the same illogical oxymoron as would be involved in electing a Leader of the Anarchist Party. Dropping the designation would involve amending the Royal Style and Titles, both in Britain and the other realms, to remove the addition made in 1953. It is more likely that the next accession will see a row about the position of Scotland. In any case, the monarchical moniker is not a job description: British sovereigns claimed to rule France until 1802, and even the Prince of Wales seems unsure what is required from a Defender of the Faith. Terminating the Headship after the present reign would be no criticism of the Queen, but rather an acknowledgement that her commitment has been unique and irreplaceable. A global scholarship programme, perhaps an Oxbridge research institute, would offer appropriate and grateful recognition.

Authors are fallible, and major publishers must provide editorial safety nets. No doubt "Ottowa" (twice), "Aukland", a "Gallop" poll and a Caribbean "Granada" are unlucky misprints, but in a book of this quality they should not have got through. Somebody should have corrected the names of Jo Grimond, Cledwyn Hughes and Wallis Simpson -- and Australia has no "Northern Territories". (144) But I quarrel with the author himself on three points. British governments take office, not "power" (132, 160), as they quickly discover if they try to change things. Murphy reports that Norman St John Stevas "refuted" the story of a rift between the Queen and Margaret Thatcher. I read Stevas's 28-word statement in The Times of 21 July 1986 not as a refutation but a denial. (165) The concept of logical, point-by-point rebuttal is fundamental to both academic and political debate, and "refute" must not subside into a general term of nay-saying. The statement that Grenada's ousted prime minster Maurice Bishop was "executed" after a coup is also objectionable. (166) As with the execution of a warrant or a will, the term when used as a shorthand for capital punishment implies the carrying out of a legitimate and legal process. Bishop was murdered.

Both monarchy and Commonwealth are subjects that somehow encourage people to talk nonsense. Murphy provides two choice examples. In 1949, Attlee was entranced by the universality of the image of the royal family, even comparing then to "the Holy Family in the Christian world." (3) The response of his correspondent, Nehru -- an agnostic of Hindu background -- is not recorded. Even more delightful was the scheme proposed by Northern Ireland prime minister Terence O'Neill to smuggle the Queen Mother into Rhodesia after UDI, relying upon her "fantastic natural charm" to win the settlers back to British rule. "She just might bring this off." (103) Alas, apart from the logistical challenges, the sympathies of the dowager Queen Elizabeth would probably have encouraged the rebels. The project was dropped.

The Commonwealth represents a continuous process of self-examination, and its nature and functions will continue to be scrutinised in the years ahead. Philip Murphy is to be congratulated on a broad, sensible and insightful survey that illuminates the agenda and charts some of the answers.

Ged Martin

National University of Ireland, Galway